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Debord, Constant, and the politics of situationist urbanism 
Urbanism and Politics 
What follows offers a critical evaluation of the model of urban practice that stood at the 
centre of the inaugural phase of the French artistic/political collective the Situationist 
International (SI) between 1957 and 1960. This model was theoretically articulated under 
the title ‘unitary urbanism’ and arose principally out of collaboration between the leading 
figure of the SI, Guy Debord, and the Dutch artist and architect Constant Nieuwenhuys, 
known simply as Constant. Constant’s efforts both during and after his involvement with 
the SI centred on his New Babylon, a project for a new form of urban life that envisioned 
the replacement of utilitarian urban planning by a new mobile urbanism of play. As will 
be shown in detail, the situationist critique of urbanism and architecture turns on the 
substantive political question of genuine popular participation under the conditions of 
advanced urbanization. In a contemporary context in which the majority of the world’s 
population are now living in an urban environment,i the question raised by the situationist 
critique is more rather than less urgent. Though it may appear at first glance that this 
critique has little relevance to the contemporary debate, I argue in what follows that the 
basic practices and ideas of situationist urbanism offer indispensable tools for 
constructing a progressive political response to contemporary urban management. This 
significance derives in large part from the fact that the SI did not primarily offer a theory 
of the urban but rather models and forms of critical urban practice. For ultimately urban 
politics is about who has the right to appear in public space and which activities are 
deemed legitimate within it. In order to appreciate the place of the situationist 
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contribution within the broader context of urban theory and practice it is necessary to 
have at the outset a general sense of some salient historical developments.  
In The Urban Revolution from 1970 the social theorist Henri Lefebvreii grasps the 
urban street according to a dialectical tension of emancipation and control: 
 
The street is a place to play and learn. The street is disorder. All the elements of urban 
life, which are fixed and redundant elsewhere, are free to fill the streets and through the 
streets flow to the centers, where they meet and interact, torn from their fixed abode. This 
order is alive. It informs. It surprises […] The street, a series of displays, an exhibition of 
objects for sale, illustrates how the logic of mechandise is accompanied by a form of 
(passive) contemplation that assumes the appearance and significance of an aesthetics 
and an ethics […] In this sense we can speak of a colonization of the urban space, which 
takes place in the street through the image, through publicity, through the spectacle of 
objects – a “system of objects” that has become symbol and spectacle.iii 
 
For Lefebvre the urban street is the locus of political confrontation. As a consequence the 
field of knowledge and practice that goes by the innocuous and banal sounding name of 
‘urban planning’ should be recognized as vital for any emancipatory political project that 
seeks to be materially effective. In general terms, since the seminal programme of urban 
renewal carried out by Haussmann as Prefect of Paris in the 1850s and 60s, urbanism has 
predominantly taken the form of state and municipal intervention aiming at the 
suppression of civil unrest and broader regimentation of public life. While today urban 
renewal programmes often strive to elicit community input into the devising and realizing 
of plans, in most cases it is highly questionable whether such efforts constitute genuine 
 3 
popular participation. According to Lefebvre’s terse formulation the urban is “a place 
where conflicts are expressed”,iv and within this place of conflict urbanism represents 
essentially the effort of the state to maintain its citizenry within the bounds of advanced 
commodity capitalism:  
 
urbanism is a mask and a tool: a mask for the state and political action, a tool of interests 
that are dissimulated within a strategy and a socio-logic. Urbanism does not try to model 
space as a work of art. It does not even try to do so in keeping with its technological 
imperatives, as it claims. The space it creates is political.v  
 
This thoroughgoing suspicion and sceptism with respect to the political mission of state-
based urbanism comes in the immediate wake of the events of civil dissent that 
culminated in Paris with the short-lived alliance between students and millions of 
workers in 1968. In the ensuing forty years, and particularly over the last decade, state 
and municipal programmes of urban renewal have been pitched according to a logic of 
consensus-building between variously identified ‘stakeholders’. Such a logic stands in 
stark opposition to the conflictual model of urbanism propounded by Lefebvre, being 
regulated at the most basic level by a drive towards convergence and the effective 
elimination of difference between interested parties. It is important to note, however, that 
the ostensive concern of Lefebvre and contemporary urbanism is the same: how to 
organize effective public participation. In a recent article Tim Richardson and Stephen 
Connelly show how the present consensus model of participation within urbanism is part 
of a broader shift within party political thinking, a shift theoretically articulated by the 
sociologist Anthony Giddens in the form of ‘Third Way’ politics and adopted in the UK 
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by New Labour in the mid-1990s.vi Richardson and Connelly further show how this 
move towards a consensus model in political discourse and practice is intimately 
connected to an adoption of the notion of ‘communicative rationality’ as articulated in the 
social discourse theory of Habermas elaborated in the 1980s and 90s.vii They point out 
that, as with Third Way politics, Habermasian communicative rationality turns on 
reducing out instances of confrontation and conflict through the identification of common 
ground upon which consensus can be built.  While endorsing a more modest model of 
what they call ‘pragmatic consensus’, Richardson and Connelly make clear that the 
influential Habermasian notion of discursive consensus remains largely blind to the 
machinations of pre-existent power structures and positions within any communicative 
situation. They remark: 
 
It is thus necessary to draw a clear distinction between ideal consensus and what happens 
in practice, and to examine in detail the inevitable processes of exclusion that result from 
the myriad conscious and unconscious decisions through which a public involvement 
process is steered towards what one might term pragmatic consensus.viii     
 
It is questionable, however, whether adopting a regulating principle of consensus even in 
this more modest, ‘pragmatic’ form is either workable or desirable. In recent years 
influential political theorists within the radical tradition have cogently argued that the 
consensus model does not offer a credible way of resolving political conflict but rather 
denies the very core of political life as such, namely confrontation between qualitatively 
different interests. According to this perspective the putative neutrality of the consensus 
model is in actual fact merely a rhetorical mask for what in practice amounts to a 
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capitulation to dominant power structures and vested interests. To regulate political life 
by means of a consensus principle is basically to decide in advance that entrenched 
differences of material and symbolic capital will go unchallenged. Genuine political 
action, by contrast, brings conflict over differences of power to manifest, public 
expression. Two examples of contemporary anti-consensualist political theory suffice to 
give an indication. In the first case Chantal Mouffe offers the following general remark:  
 
I contend that the belief in the possibility of a universal rational consensus has put 
democratic thinking on the wrong track. Instead of trying to design the institutions which, 
through supposed ‘impartial’ procedures, would reconcile all conflicting interests and 
values, the task for democratic theorists and politicians should be to envisage the creation 
of a vibrant ‘agonistic’ public sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political 
projects can be confronted.ix      
 
Secondly, Jacque Rancière offers a similar account of the nature of the political that takes 
consensus theory to task and grasps genuine political agency as arising out of the public 
expression of grievance on the part of the oppressed: 
 
Parties do not exist prior to the conflict they name and in which they are counted as 
parties. The “discussion” of wrong is not an exchange – not even a violent one – between 
constituent partners. It concerns the speech situation itself and its performers. Politics 
does not exist because men, through the privilege of speech, place their interests in 
common. Politics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking 
beings make themselves of some account, setting up a community by the fact of placing 
 6 
in common a wrong that is more than this very confrontation, the contradiction of two 
worlds in a single world …x  
 
The common position taken by Mouffe and Rancière has obvious affinities with 
Lefebvre’s radical critique of urbanism, insofar as it takes confrontation to be a basic, 
irreducible feature of genuine democratic politics rather than a threat or deficiency to be 
reduced out through consensus formation. But Lefebvre’s account adds something crucial 
to the conflictual models articulated by Mouffe and Rancière, namely a positive principle 
of collective desire that can potentially overcome the social separation engendered by 
advanced commodity capitalism. Lefevbre states: 
 
We could therefore define the urban as a place where conflicts are expressed, reversing 
the separation of places where expression disappears, where silence reigns, where the 
signs of separation are established. The urban could also be defined as the place of desire, 
where desire emerges from need, where it is concentrated because it is recognized, where 
Eros and Logos can (possibly) be found side by side.xi  
 
Such a principle of desire lies at the heart of the early situationist critique of urbanism, 
with its call for the establishment of an urban geography of passion, the creation of ‘state-
of-mind’ urban sectors, and more generally in its broad assault on the instrumentalized 
rationality of modernist urbanism. In the central sections of this discussion the situationist 
contribution to urban theory and practice is examined with a view to its constructing 
credible material practices of political dissent and confrontation. Although this 
contribution is found to be caught up in various theoretical aporias, it is nevertheless 
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contended that the situationist approach has much to offer contemporary struggles of 
urban resistance.     
 
Modernist urbanism and the situationist critique 
If, as I contend, the underlying initial concern of the SI relates to the conditions of 
genuine social participation in the context of advanced urbanization, an important 
prerequisite for appreciating the situationist contribution involves positioning it within a 
broader contemporary reaction against the paradigm of architectural modernism. This 
paradigm is arguably most clearly exemplified by the theory and practice of the 
modernist architect Le Corbusier. Through a series of texts and architectural projects in 
the 1920s Le Corbusier became an eloquent and consistent advocate of a kind of 
elementarism in the arts, a position first given theoretical formulation in 1920 in the co-
authored article ‘Purism’.xii Operating according to a kind of aesthetic and architectural 
atomism, Le Corbusier attempted to reformulate the underlying principles of 
construction, beginning with the elementary unit of the individual dwelling and 
progessing to his sketch for ‘a city of three million inhabitants’. Ironically for someone 
who prides himself on a thoroughly rational approach, the power of Le Corbusier’s early 
texts derives in great measure from a sustained rhetorical appeal to the need for a ‘new 
spirit’ to dispel the perceived cultural decadance of the nineteenth-century obsession with 
architectural styles. More significantly for present purposes, in the context of the 
immediate aftermath of the Russian Revolution and the end of World War One this 
rhetoric crucially turns on the notion that a radical renewal in architectural practice is 
necessary to avoid widespread social and political change. As the sententious tone of Le 
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Corbusier’s 1923 architectural manifesto, Towards a New Architecture, affirms: “The 
various classes of workers in society to-day no longer have dwellings adapted to their 
needs; neither the artisan not the intellectual. It is a question of building which is at the 
root of the social unrest of to-day; architecture or revolution”.xiii While this is not the 
place to offer a detailed account of Le Corbusier’s early urbanism, it is important to note 
that it possesses an overtly social and political character. In the face of widespread 
political turbulence across continental Europe and an attendant fear that the 
internationalist mission of early Soviet communism would bear fruit, Le Corbusier 
advocates an explictly counter-revolutionary urbanism. As such it represents one instance 
of a broader contemporary ‘recall to order’ within liberal democratic politics and culture. 
Over the succeeding decades the appeal of Le Corbusier’s urbanism proved sufficient to 
raise it to the status of the dominant paradigm.  
By the late 1950s, however, the social ordering brought about by this paradigm 
was increasingly viewed as a prime cause rather than cure of the decay of urban life. 
From around this time a powerful critique arose that attacked a key tenet of modernist 
urbanism, namely that allowing the logic of advanced capitalist production unfettered 
sway in shaping the urban environment would necessarily bring with it the best overall 
social conditions. For this critique, by contrast, the legacy of a generation of modernist 
urbanism was the effective dissolution of local urban community. Jane Jacobs in her 
celebrated 1961 study, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, offers the following 
characterization: 
 
Le Corbusier was planning not only a physical environment. He was planning for  social 
Utopia too. Le Corbusier’s Utopia was a condition of what he called maximum individual 
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liberty, by which he seems to have meant not liberty to do anything much, but liberty 
from ordinary responsibility. In his Radiant City nobody, presumably, was going to be his 
brother’s keeper any more. Nobody was going to have to struggle with plans of his own. 
Nobody was going to be tied down.xiv  
 
As with Lefebvre, Jacobs underscores the functional subordination of the urban street 
according to Le Corbusier’s urbanism: “… he kept the pedestrians off the streets and in 
the parks. His city was like a wonderful mechanical toy”xv. The overall affect of 
modernist urbanism for critics such as Jacobs and Lefebvre is one of widespread social 
passivity engendered by lack of genuine public space. More precisely, such public space 
as is afforded by Le Corbusier’s schemes – typically the interstitial spaces of the ‘garden 
city’ model - produces places suited predominantly to highly individualized and 
depoliticized activities. For Le Corbusier’s critics such space is unworthy of the title 
‘public’ for the simple reason that it prohibits rather than elicits opportunities for 
manifest popular agency and practices of contestation. Marshall Berman, in his extensive 
critical history of modernity and modernism, sums up the logic of separation and 
passivity that regulates Le Corbusier’s urbanism simply and effectively: “modernist 
architecture and planning created a modernized version of pastoral: a spatially and 
socially segmented world – people here, traffic there; work here, homes there; rich here, 
poor there; barriers of grass and concrete in between …”xvi. 
If the basic result ascribed to modernist urbanism by its critics is social separation 
and mass passivity but shaping the urban environment is still taken to carry crucial 
political significance, then the problem of legitimate constructive agency with respect to 
this environment becomes a central concern. Le Corbusier’s architectural code is 
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essentially characterized by a vertical hierarchy of constructive legitimacy. Simply put, 
the few construct the material environment for the many. A basic question arises here: is 
the only radical alternative to centralized architectural control a model of urban 
construction according to which all inhabitants of urban space collectively produce and 
reproduce their own material environment? An obvious consequence of such a model 
would be the elimination of socially exclusive architectural agency, and thus the end of 
architecture in any traditionally recognizable form.  
Having sketched some salient features of the historical context I now turn to an 
examination of the situationist formulation of the critique of modernist urbanism. For the 
early SI any genuinely popular project of social emancipation would have to begin and 
end with radical practices of urban construction and transformation. For the protagonists 
of the SI urbanism as it had been practiced simply organized the material environment 
according to the dictates of mass passivity and consumption. In other words, modernist 
urbanism’s basic task was to give physical expression to the alienation and separation 
engendered by the ideology of consumer capitalism, thereby consolidating that condition 
as a social fact across the industrialized world. In the situationist text ‘Critique of 
Urbanism’ from 1961 the basic diagnosis of the total subordination of material space to 
commodity capitalism is understood as indicating that any future programme of political 
resistance will have to be of an equally total nature: 
 
Henceforth the crisis of urbanism is all the more concretely a social and political one, even 
though today no force born of traditional politics is any longer capable of dealing with it … 
the bureaucratic consumer society is here and there beginning to shape its own 
environment. This society, with its new towns, is building the sites that accurately represent 
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it, combining the conditions most suitable for its proper functioning, while at the same time 
translating into spatial terms, in the clear language of the organization of everyday life, its 
fundamental principle of alienation and constraint.xvii  
 
If for the SI modern urbanism is “the final decadence of the Great Architect” that has the 
result of making “alienation tangible”,xviii any political resistance to urbanism must begin 
by contesting the idea of intellectual superiority with which the image of architectural 
agency is traditionally invested. As indicated in relation to Le Corbusier, this supposition 
of superiority leads to a social model according to which a small minority within a 
community are rendered active and productive of social conditions whereas the vast 
majority are placed in a situation of passive acquiesence. While the initial programme of 
the SI demonstrates an acute awareness that challenging the modernist model must 
involve practices of contestation on a local scale, it recognizes at the same time that the 
eventual goal of such acts must be coextensive with modernist urbanism itself. 
Adequate understanding of the ‘crisis of urbanism’ addressed by the SI further 
involves recognizing that the retreat from utopia in modernist architecture stemmed 
primarily from economic and political factors. According to the analysis offered by 
Manfredo Tafuri in his text Architecture and Utopia,xix for example, developments in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s showed that the utopian projections of modernist architecture 
ultimately failed not primarily because they offered instrinsically unattractive social 
models but rather due to a lack of suitable economic and political preconditions. For 
Tafuri political reactions to the economic turbulence of the 1920s lead either to an 
erosion of the architectural avant-garde in favour of centralized bureacratic pragmatism 
or to the transformation of modernist utopian impulses into the nostalgic reactionary 
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politics of fascism. According to Tafuri, faced with a situation in which its utopian 
impulse was to be subordinated to bureaucratic and statist expediency, the artistic and 
architectural avant-garde had degenerated into a generalized ‘ideology of form’ by the 
mid-1930s. Thus the failure of utopianism in modern architecture is taken as 
symptomatic of broader historical conditions under which the whole cultural avant-garde 
is effectively neutralized as a progessive social-political force. If Tafuri’s analysis is 
correct, from the late 1920s on the utopian projects of twentieth-century western art and 
architecture lacked sufficient social efficacy to counter the consolidation of power within 
technocratic state bureaucracies.  
The early SI fully agreed with Tafuri’s contention that the artistic avant-garde was 
no longer equal to its original task of radical social transformation. In a typical 
assessment from 1958 they assert: “For revolutionaries there can be no turning back. The 
world of artistic expression, whatever its content, has already lapsed. It repeats itself 
scandalously in order to keep going as long as the dominant society succeeds in 
preserving the privation and scarcity that are the anachronistic conditions of its reign”.xx 
Offering a clarification of the situationist relationship to the artistic avant-garde, the 
philosopher and social theorist Giorgio Agamben speaks of an attempt to reach a “point 
of indifference” between art and life. For Agamben the basic SI task of the ‘construction 
of situations’ is accordingly grasped as a shift from the modernist urge to construct a 
radically new urban order to an effort to transform collective life through practices of 
contestation operating within the actual material conditions of urban existence:  
 
Nothing would be more misleading … than to think the situation as a privileged or 
exceptional moment in the sense of aestheticism. The situation is neither the becoming-
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art of life nor the becoming-life of art. We can comprehend its true nature only if we 
locate it historically in its proper place: that is, after the end and self-destruction of art 
[…] The Situationists counteract capitalism … with a concrete, although opposite, 
project. Their utopia is, once again, perfectly topical because it locates itself in the taking-
place of what it wants to overthrow.xxi  
 
The sense of this “topical utopia” is a form of praxis that attempts to subvert prevalent 
social conditions not through appeal to a radically different material-social situation, but 
rather through a subversive use of the very mechanisms of consumer capitalism itself. In 
the situationist practice of ‘subversion’ (détournement), for example, the clichéd and 
manipulative use of images within advertising is appropriated in order to sharpen rather 
than dull critical consciousness. More directly relevant to the present focus on modern 
architecture and urbanism, the other key situationist practice of urban drifting or dérive 
sets out to counteract the conditioning of subjects by the utilitarian logic of urban 
planning. In both situationist modes of praxis the goal is the engendering of a shared 
critical rapport with the physical environment of commodity capitalism, the first in 
relation to visual culture and the second in relation to the built environment. To the extent 
that such practices may be legitimately considered utopian in nature, it must be 
acknowledged from the outset that they seek to establish socially transformative potential 






The dérive and the programme of unitary urbanism  
In the most renowned situationist text, The Society of the Spectacle from 1967, Guy 
Debord remarks: 
 
Just as the accumulation of commodities mass-produced for the abstract space of the market 
inevitably shattered all regional and legal barriers … so too it was bound to dissipate the 
independence and quality of places. The power to homogenize is the heavy artillery that has 
battered down all Chinese walls.xxii 
 
This remark opens a section of the text devoted to the question of urban planning and as 
such expresses a basic antagonism towards urbanism characteristic of the SI from its 
inception a decade earlier. Although the critique of urbanism is vividly set out in the 1967 
text, only a faint echo of the SI’s early counter-practices is to be found towards the end of 
the section in question. Debord comments: 
 
The proletarian revolution is that critique of human geography whereby individuals and 
communities must construct places and events commensurate with the appropriation, no 
longer just of their labour, but of their total history. By virtue of the resulting mobile space of 
play, and by virtue of freely chosen variations in the rules of the game, the independence of 
places will be rediscovered without any new exclusive tie to the soil, and thus too the 
authentic journey will be restored to us, along with authentic life understood as a journey 
containing its whole meaning within itself.xxiii 
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The counter-urbanist practice productive of a “mobile space of play” originally took the 
form of drifting or dérive and was initially a feature of the pre-situationist Lettrist group 
from around 1953 onwards. Already as a Lettrist activity the dérive was consciously 
taken over from the early surrealists’ habit of wandering the less conspicuous and 
fashionable streets of Paris in search of uncanny sites and chance encounters. In a text 
originally published in 1956 and later included in the second issue of the SI journal in 
1958 Debord sets out the basic sense of urban drifting: 
 
One of the basic situationist practices is the dérive, a technique of rapid passage through 
varied ambiances. Dérives involve playful-constructive behaviour and awareness of 
psychogeographical effects, and are thus quite different from the classic notions of journey or 
stroll. In a dérive one or more persons during a certain period drop their relations, their work 
and leisure activities, and all their other usual motives for movement and action, and let 
themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the encounters they find there. 
Chance is a less important factor in this activity than one might think: from a dérive point of 
view cities have psychogeographical contours, with constant currents, fixed points and 
vortexes that strongly discourage entry into or exit from certain zones.xxiv  
A keyword in this description of the dérive is the composite adjective ‘playful-
constructive’.  As a social practice situationist drifting is understood to involve two basic 
aspects. First, a conscious break with habitual and purely utilitarian urban itineraries is 
made that allows the pedestrian a non-instrumental, more spontaneous rapport towards 
the material environment. Secondly, the construction of a new sense of place is arrived at 
through collective experience of the psychological-emotional traits of different sites. This 
second feature or result of the dérive has as a broader goal the production of so-called 
 16 
‘psychogeographical’ mappings of the urban environment, that is, graphic representations 
that indicate affective intensities experienced at a particular locale. 
 A conspicuous feature of situationist counter-urbanist practice is a manifest 
tension between its playful or ‘ludic’ dimension on the one hand and its observational, 
quasi-scientific character on the other. Debord demonstrates an awareness of this tension 
in his text on the dérive cited above:  
The spatial field of a dérive may be precisely delimited or vague, depending on whether the 
goal is to study a terrain or to emotionally disorient oneself. It should not be forgotten that 
these two aspects of dérives overlap in so many ways that it is impossible to isolate one of 
them in a pure state […] In every case the spatial field depends first of all on the point of 
departure – the residence of the solo dériver or the meeting place selected by a group. The 
maximum area of this spatial field does not extend beyond the entirety of a large city and its 
suburbs. At its minimum it can be limited to a small self-contained ambiance: a single 
neighborhood or even a single block of houses if it’s interesting enough (the extreme case 
being a static-dérive of an entire day within the Saint-Lazare train station).xxv  
Given the opposition to modernist urbanism present within the SI from the outset xxvi it is 
surprising that initially the situationists pursued a programme of what they called ‘unitary 
urbanism’. In light of the tension within the early SI between an experimental-scientific 
and a playful-artistic rapport with the urban environment, unitary urbanism represents the 
former term. As such it gave rise to the prospective science of ‘psychogeography’ that 
was to record and graphically represent the affective-psychological influence of the built 
environment on ‘drifting’ subjects.xxvii The programme of unitary urbanism came about 
largely through the colloboration between Guy Debord and the Dutch artist/architect 
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Constant. Constant was a key figure within the post-WWII group of primitivist painters 
known as CoBrA (derived from the locations of the contributors: Copenhagen, Brussels, 
Amsterdam).xxviii With the dissolution of the CoBrA group in 1951 Constant moved away 
from painting towards experimental architectural drawing. In 1957, the year prior to the 
inaugural declaration of the Amsterdam branch of the SI of which Constant was a 
founding and influential member, Debord set out the basic situationist task in the 
following way: 
Our central purpose is the construction of situations, that is, the concrete construction of 
temporary settings of life and their transformation into a higher, passionate nature. We must 
develop an intervention directed by the complicated factors of two great components in 
perpetual interaction: the material setting of life and the behaviours that it incites and that 
overturn it. Our prospects for action on the environment lead, in their latest development, to 
the idea of unitary urbanism. Unitary urbanism first becomes clear in the use of the whole of 
arts and techniques as means cooperating in an integral composition of the environment.xxix 
This notion of the “construction of situations” is reformulated a year later by the 
collective statement of the Amsterdam SI in the following manner: “Only urbanism will 
be able to become that unitary art that responds to the exigencies of dynamic creativity, 
the creativity of life”xxx. At play here in the idea of unitary urbanism are two basic 
concerns. First, such urbanism involves appropriating the task of the western avant-garde 
especially since Dada, namely an overcoming of art as a limited, ‘abstract’ (in a Hegelian 
sense) sphere of praxis in the context of modern material production. According to this 
task, art is to break free from its abstract particularity and become unitary in the sense of 
comprehensive or total. Secondly, art is to become truly dialectical in the sense of 
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consciously producing or co-producing the human environment for the purpose of 
realizing the potential richness in varieties of human forms of life. According to this 
second basic task unitary urbanism would work to counteract the homogenizing of space 
by advanced commodity capitalism as proclaimed by Debord in The Society of the 
Spectacle.  
In the period that spans the original announcement of the programme of unitary 
urbanism in 1957 and Constant’s departure from the group in 1960 tensions with regard 
to both basic tasks identified above surface. First, largely under Debord’s direction, the SI 
become less inclined to see itself as any kind of continuation of the artistic avant-garde. 
This means, among other things, that it must stand not just against urbanism in its 
functionalist mode but against urbanism tout court. Accordingly, in line with Lefebvre’s 
stance in 1970, urbanism as such must be contested. With regard to the further initial 
concern with the ‘construction of situations’, the core of the SI appears to retreat from the 
initial utopian project of envisaging and realizing a richer field of collective urban 
experience. Thus, as Constant continues for produce sketches and models of an 
alternative architectural utopia, Debord and others in the SI begin to suspect a 
capitulation to the very logic of instrumentalized urbanism they seek to overthrow.  
In a key text that predates his withdrawal from the group, ‘A Different City for a 
Different Life’ (from the third issue of the SI journal from 1959),xxxi Constant 
characterizes unitary urbanism as an urbanism of pleasure. In this, as in his work 
throughout the 1960s, Constant envisages a redirection of the social results of modern 
material technologies away from the bureaucratic atomism of modernist urbanism 
towards genuine forms of mass participation. In more specific architectural or urbanist 
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terms, Constant’s approach opposes the modernist urban programmes of zoned, radiant or 
garden cities and insists on the need for agglomeration, thereby arguing that unitary 
urbanism is above all the attempt to overcome separation and individualism through the 
construction of an environment built for collective play:  
 
Instead of the idea of a garden city, which most modern architects have adopted, we set up 
the image of the covered city, where the layout of thoroughfares and isolated buildings has 
given way to a continuous spatial construction, elevated above the ground, and which will 
include groups of dwellings as well as public spaces (permitting modifications of purpose 
depending on the needs of the moment). Since all traffic, in the functional sense, will pass 
underneath or on overhead terraces, streets can be done away with. The great number of 
traversable spaces of which a city is composed form a vast and complex social space. Far 
from a return to nature – the notion of living in a park, as solitary aristocrats once did – we 
see in such immense constructions the possibility of overcoming nature and regulating at will 
the atmosphere, lighting, and sounds in these various spaces. xxxii 
 
What is immediately striking about Constant’s vision of the future city, despite its 
polemical tone, is its obvious affinity within modernist urbanism. For instance, the 
raising up of dwelling space away from ground level and the construction of distinct 
raised or underground levels devoted to uninhibited traffic circulation are readily 
recognizable features of Le Corbusier’s urban projections from the early 1920s on.xxxiii In 
fact Constant’s urbanism appears to absolutize the separation of architectural construction 
and natural environment (form and materiality) in a manner that would have appeared 
neither desirable nor tenable for early modernist architecture. Furthermore, in 
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characterizing the basic task of unitary urbanism as an “overcoming of nature” Constant 
runs the risk of collapsing the dialectical understanding of artistic practice (that is, artistic 
agency and material environment in a relation of mutual determination) proclaimed by 
Debord within his account of the construction of situations. Within the specific context of 
urbanism this amounts to rejecting the necessity of engaging within actual cities as the 
given environments produced by capitalist production and instead projecting entirely new 
cities of the future. As indicated, the dérive as a critical urban practice resists this 
tendency towards formal utopianism, insofar as it seeks to realize possibilities of playful 
group behaviour within the very materialized contexts of capitalist control and 
separation. In seemingly stark contrast to this, Constant posits an architectural tabula 
rasa far more radical than anything put forward by Le Corbusier in the 1920s. In this 
sense, for Constant there is simply is no city other than the city of the future.  
 
Progressive urbanism and political praxis 
Both Constant’s affinity with architectural modernism and his tendency towards formal 
utopianism led to tensions with Debord that precipitated his withdrawal from the SI in the 
spring of 1960. The article ‘Critique of Urbanism’ from 1961 (cited above) contains the 
harshest denunciation by the SI of their former member, accusing Constant of dealing in 
“public relations for the integration of the masses into capitalist technological 
civilization”.xxxiv However, the more general reflections on architecture and urbanism 
offered by this article merely succeed in underscoring rather than clarifying the 
unresolved tensions with Constant. For Constant is in agreement with the key contentions 
that unitary urbanism must address the social milieu in total and that urbanism as it is 
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actually practiced is invariably partial and socially repressive in its actions and 
aspirations. Beyond the personal invective, however, what appears to be more genuinely 
at stake is the ability of any possible manner of urbanism to address what is taken to be 
the increasingly radical ‘colonization of everyday life’ by capitalist commodity 
production. At the centre of the article lies the contention that the situationist idea of 
unitary urbanism is not proposed as another variant or species of traditional urbanism, but 
is in fact a radical critique of all existing forms of urban planning in the name of another, 
essentially distinct practical-productive relation to the urban environment.  
The position outlined by the ‘Critique of Urbanism’ raises the crucial question of 
whether it makes any sense to view situationist unitary urbanism as anything other than 
the negation of any possible determinate urbanism. My aim here is to emphasize the 
positive and productive outcome the situationists envisaged as emerging out if this 
negation. According to this approach, the absence of urbanism asserted in the article is to 
be understood as the point of departure for the contestatory practices of détournement and 
dérive described earlier. As the article states:  
If unitary urbanism designates, as we would like it to, a useful hypothesis that would allow 
present humanity to construct life freely, beginning with its urban environment, it is 
absolutely pointless to enter into discussion with those who would ask us to what extent it is 
feasible, concrete, practical, or carved in stone. For the simple reason that nowhere does 
there exist any theory or practice concerning the creation of cities, or the kind of behavior 
that relates to it. No one “does urbanism,” in the sense of constructing the milieu required by 
this doctrine […] And all the discourses on urbanism are lies, just as obviously as the space 
organized by urbanism is the very space of the social lie and of fortified exploitation. Those 
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who discourse on the powers of urbanism seek to make people forget that all they are 
creating is the urbanism of power.xxxv 
The basic issue at stake between Constant and the SI after 1960 can be expressed as 
follows: Can architectural/urbanist utopianism be effective in countering the social 
alienation produced by the mechanisms of advanced commodity capitalism? A further 
crucial question that arises here is whether the early situationist programme of unitary 
urbanism can be seen to have credible potential as transformative praxis in the absence of 
any attempt to build upon the efforts of earlier urbanism. In light of this question, the 
dispute with Constant is subject to a paradoxical twist. For whereas Constant’s sketches 
and models implicitly appropriate many technical features of earlier urbanism, his 
explicitly expressed position proclaims an absolute break with all previous urbanism. As 
indicated, this can be understood – and presumably was so understood by other members 
of the SI at the time – as an absolutizing of the ‘Great Architect’ rather than a 
demythologization of modern architecture and urbanism. By contrast, the situationist 
practices of dérive and détournement – the latter being perhaps most fully realized in 
Debord’s use of cinematic montagexxxvi – represent an attempt to radicalize modernist 
modes of practice by finally giving them the scope and power to contest the social 
conditions of advanced commodity capitalism. In this light the dispute with Constant 
within the early SI centres on the following question: must a revolutionary urban praxis 
build upon or definitely break with the ‘ruins’ of modernist architecture and urbanism?  
What separates Constant from the remaining members of the SI after 1960 can be 
schematically expressed through an opposition of formal and material utopianism. 
Though there are obvious inadequacies to this schematization I believe it does offer a 
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conceptual framework in which to articulate what is at stake in the dispute. The first thing 
to say is that each side of the dispute contains elements of both formal and material 
utopianism. Constant for his part asserts a basic split between technology and nature 
(undialectical/formal), but practically assimilates aspects of earlier phases of modernist 
urbanism (dialectical/material). On the other hand, Debord and other members of the SI 
beyond 1960 insist on an absolute separation from previous practices of modern art 
(undialectical/formal), while in practice assimilating a certain number of those very 
practices (dialectical/material). At the same time it is important to underscore that there is 
agreement on two key points: first, the need to resist any mythologizing nostalgia for pre-
industrial society; and secondly, the necessity to dissolve art as a separate sphere of 
praxis so that its transformative and emancipatory social potential can be realized. This 
second point of common ground between Constant and the SI beyond 1960 involves an 
explicit rejection of the socially transformative pretensions of the artistic avant-garde in 
its modernist formulation. The critique of Constant, however, seems to turn on ascribing 
to him an attenuated reaffirmation of precisely these pretensions. This critique also entails 
a rejection of the specific means of urban planning or any other recognized sphere of 
artistic-technical production. As the editorial notes of a 1963 issue of the SI journal insist: 
We see that when we comply with the requests of those who urge us to exhibit usable and 
convincing detailed plans – why should we have to convince them? – they either turn 
against us at once as proof of our utopianism, or else favor a watered-down version for 
the moment. The truth is that you can ask for detailed plans from almost all the others … 
but certainly not from us; it is our thesis that there can be no fundamental cultural renewal 
in details, but only in toto.xxxvii 
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In my view this rhetorical opposition of part and whole is particularly unsuited to the task 
of formulating practices of urban contestation. As such the SI’s retreat from unitary 
urbanism after 1960 placed a desire for purity of intention over the need for specific 
material means of oppositional praxis. Detailed examination of the various strands of 
modernist urbanism demonstrates, I believe, that it possesses genuinely emancipatory 
potential. While any attempt to ground this claim by recourse to the history of modern 
architecture is obviously beyond the scope of the present article, further examination of 
Constant’s urban utopia yields important indications for the any possible radical 
appropriation of modernist urbanism.  Accordingly, in the final sections of this article I 
wish to argue that in fact Constant’s efforts to project in detail possible future 
configurations of an emancipated social-material environment do possess genuine 
transformative potential. By implication the retreat of the SI from its initial programme of 
unitary urbanism represents an important lost opportunity. In order to consider this in 
more concrete detail I turn to the main focus of Constant’s efforts both during his time as 
a member if the SI and beyond, namely his New Babylon project. Through an 
examination of this project I aim to reach some preliminary conclusions on the positive 





Constant’s New Babylon project and architectural utopianism  
After his withdrawal from the SI Constant intensified his work on an architectural utopia 
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in the form of his New Babylon project: a vision for an ideal built environment elaborated 
largely through sketches and models over the following decade and a half.xxxviii Begun 
around 1959, an exhibition of his work on this project was held in Amsterdam in 1974. A 
catalogue accompanying the exhibition offers a theoretical sketch that rests upon the 
familiar dichotomy of instrumental and playful practice:  
 
If we situate all known forms of society under a single common denominator, 
'utilitarianism,' the model to be invented will be that of a 'ludic' society – this term 
designating the activities that, relieved of all utility as well as all function, are pure products 
of the creative imagination. Now, it is as a creator, and only as a creator, that humanity can 
fulfil and attain its highest existential level. In imagining a society in which each is free to 
create her life, to give it shape according to her deepest aspirations, we will not have 
recourse to the forms and images of this long period of history in which humanity has had to 
sacrifice the greater part of its creative energy in an unceasing struggle for existence. Our 
social model will be, indeed, fundamentally different from preceding models; it will also be 
qualitatively superior.xxxix 
Inspired by the Dutch cultural theorist Johan Huizinga and his notion of homo ludens, 
Constant’s radical urbanism has clear affinities with the artistic and ideological legacy of 
romanticism centred on the notion of autonomous imaginative agency. Through the 
crucial mediation of architectural modernism, however, Constant’s approach is quite 
distinct from traditional romanticism in virtue of its positive appropriation of modern 
technological means for creative ends. The New Babylon project balances such means 
and ends through an economy of global control and local spontaneous agency. This 
balance is to occur against the backdrop of a general shift from static inhabitation to a 
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generalized nomadic mode of life: 
In our case, the urban must respond to social mobility, which implies, in relation to the 
stable town, a more rigorous organization on the macro level, and at the same time a greater 
flexibility at the micro level, which is that of an infinite complexity. Freedom of creation 
demands in any case that we depend as little as possible on material contingency. It 
presupposes, then, a vast network of collective services, more necessary to the population in 
movement than to the stable population of functional towns. On the other hand, automation 
leads to a massive concentration of production in gigantic centers, situated outside the space 
of daily life.xl  
The two elements of the nomadic city outlined here by Constant – facilitated mobility and 
separation between zones of production and consumption – again bear a close 
resemblance to innovations that stand at the centre of Le Corbusier’s early urbanism. At 
the same time it is clear that Constant’s overarching aim is to envisage a credible solution 
to the problem of social participation identified earlier as the central concern of the early 
SI. Constant’s response to this issue is to propose a radical urbanism conceived as the 
realization of a truly conscious dialectical mode of life, that is, one where agents 
collectively shape their material environment while being shaped by it. Accordingly, in 
New Babylon the built environment is constructed not according to the dictates of 
maximized efficiency as proposed by the protagonists of architectural modernism, but 
rather for the purpose of facilitating the richest variety of collective experience and 
interventions on the part of the ‘users’.  
These interventions are concretely grasped by Constant – in line with the early 
psychogeographical idea of creating zones with distinct emotional ambiances – as a 
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matter of spontaneously producing and altering affective environments. With these basic 
needs of general mobility and local malleability in mind Constant sets out in more 
concrete detail the material environment he thinks will realize the envisaged life of play:  
 
It is a mainly horizontal skeleton, extending over ten or twenty hectares at some 15-20 meters 
above the ground: the total height is somewhere between 30 and 60 meters […] A volume 
with the span of a New Babylon sector is more independent of the external world than a 
construction built on a smaller scale. Daylight, for instance, only penetrates a few meters 
there, a large part of the interior being artificially lit. The accumulation of solar heat and the 
loss of heat in cold weather occur so slowly that the changes in ambient temperature barely 
influence the temperature inside. The climatic conditions (the intensity of lighting, 
temperature, the hygrometric state, ventilation) are all under technical control. Inside, a 
variable range of climates can be created and modified at will […] The audiovisual media 
will be used in the same spirit. The fluctuating world of the sectors calls on facilities (a 
transmitting and receiving network) that are both decentralized and public. Given the 
participation of a large number of people in the transmission and reception of images and 
sounds, perfected telecommunications become an important factor in ludic social behaviour. 
When attempting to appreciate in an adequate manner Constant’s architectural utopia it is 
important to bear in mind that it is in fact his drawings, models and other plastic 
representations – rather than any theoretical account – that primarily carry the burden of 
communicating his vision of a society of play. Once this is recognized it is striking how 
powerful his graphic representations can be to a viewer otherwise unmoved by the 
theoretically questionable dichotomy of work and play. The validity of this point is of 
course by no means restricted to Constant: the writings of Le Corbusier are similarly 
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structured according to conceptual oppositions and suppositions readily amenable to 
analytical charges of theoretical inadequacy or to deconstructive unravelling. In a 
recently published collection of essays on Constant’s New Babylon project the 
architectural theorist Anthony Vidler remarks: “It would be a truism to say that all utopias 
are, of necessity, diagrammatic. The various spatial relations that embody the ideal 
society have often literally been described in this way”xli. In this light, Vidler begins his 
article by addressing the impact of Constant’s various graphic representations of a 
landscape of desire: “Registering the extraordinary historical and polemical effect of this 
unique collection of drawings, what first strikes me is the unaccountable veracity of 
Constant’s project for the New Babylon – its sense of potential realizability, or even its 
sense of having been already constructed”xlii. Another analysis within the same collection 
offered by Tom McDonough directly challenges Vidler’s affirmation of the positive 
utopian power of the diagram or visual image and identifies the role of the image in 
Constant as integral to his construction of a politically regressive “architecture of 
presence”. McDonough speaks of a “lingering inconsistency between Constant’s aims 
and the actual images he created, between New Babylon’s theoretical critique of 
urbanism and an uncritical use of his media”.xliii In common with my own analysis 
McDonough notes how Constant appropriates many of Le Corbusier’s technical means in 
an unfiltered manner, while at the same time imagining a “world of absolute modernity” 
and refusing to incorporate elements of the given urban environment. Indeed, he goes a 
step further and, repeating the central charge levelled by other members of the SI, sees in 
the New Babylon project a capitulation to the forces of capitalist instrumental rationality. 
Rather than a radical vision of social emancipation McDonough credits Constant with 
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anticipating a future stage in the eradication of qualitatively singular shared space. As 
such, New Babylon offers an uncanny image of the present material environment: 
 
In attempting to design a utopia, a no-place, Constant inadvertently prefigured our 
contemporary non-places: the airports, auto routes, shopping centers, and generally that 
whole pseudo-architecture which has come increasingly to define our everyday lives at the 
end of the century […] We might say that these drawings, even at their most powerful, remain 
mired in contradictory language rather than embodying the language of contradiction.xliv 
 
McDonough elaborates on his distinction between contradictory language and the 
language of contradiction by asserting that the latter could be developed in the form of a 
genuine “situationist architecture” through a certain extension of the practice of 
subversive montage or détournement: 
 
… it was this potential for an architecturally based montage practice that best expressed 
the situationist goal of restoring to human activity that fluid state that spectacular culture 
had congealed into its reified, frozen form. Significantly, this was no longer seen as a 
literal project of architectural flexibility, but as a political project of struggle over socially 
produced meaning in the city. The urban fabric was to be neither embraced nor rejected, 
but would become the site of contestation; if the spectacle had destroyed the 
“independence and quality of places,” détournement would occupy their ruins, first as a 
powerful propaganda tool, later as a melancholic contemplation of reification.xlv 
 
For McDonough Constant’s New Babylon compromises the situationist politics of 
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contestation by making too many concessions to architectural modernism. While there is 
much to be said in favour of this analysis, it crucially fails to recognize the degree to 
which the early programme of the SI as a whole involves a largely positive appropriation 
of modernist aesthetic practice. For the very idea of developing urban practices that allow 
alternative, counter-habitual experiences of the city constitutes an original and central 
concern of the modernist aesthetic.  
 
Situationist urbanism and the politics of contestation  
In my view, the fundamental challenge issued to the modernist regime by situationist 
practice lies at the deeper level of what Rancière calls the “distribution of the 
sensible”xlvi. According to this idea, what are usually categorized as art-historical 
movements or periods – such as ‘modernism’ in the present context – are more accurately 
grasped as historically specific regimes of power or allocations of symbolic and material 
capital. To return to the case of Le Corbusier’s version of modernist urbanism, in this 
light what is articulated is a systematic mode of defining legitimate appearance and 
agency within the public sphere. Thus, shorn of its contingent trappings of quasi-
mystical, rationalist humanism, Le Corbusier’s urbanism offers a hierarchical structuring 
of the public sphere justified by appeal to the intellect superiority of the artist-architect. 
For Rancière it is the intellectualist schema of legitimate state organization set out in 
Plato’s Republic that provides the predominant archetype for all subsequent western 
configurations of the social. In this light Le Corbusier’s urbanism might be called 
Platonism for the modern urban community. According to Rancière the work performed 
by any distribution of the sensible is first and foremost a determination of the common 
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and legitimate community: 
 
The distribution of the sensible reveals who can have a share in what is common to the 
community based on what they do and on the time and space in which this activity is 
performed. Having a particular ‘occupation’ thereby determines the ability and inability 
to take charge of what is common to the community; it defines what is visible or not in a 
common space, endowed with a common language, etc. There is thus an ‘aesthetics’ at 
the core of politics …xlvii       
 
Following this radically politicized understanding of the aesthetic regime, what kind of 
determination of the common is offered by the New Babylon project and more generally 
by situationist urbanism? Earlier, when introducing the situationist practice of urban 
drifting, I mentioned that it stemmed from a properly dialectical understanding of the 
urban environment. By this I meant that the early SI attempted to modify the collective 
experience of this environment while acknowledging that this environment has in an 
important sense already shaped those that operate within it. The practice of the dèrive 
does not have the goal of literally constructing a different urban setting – as does 
urbanism proper – but rather of modifying and expanding the habitual practices that 
typically take place within it. Constant’s project reverses this process by attempting to 
design what is taken to be a universally liberating urban environment and projecting the 
altered collective practices that would follow. In this he follows a key idea of modernist 
urbanism, namely that of shaping the place in order to facilitate prescribed activities. 
While it is tempting to dismiss this tendency as simply another case of architectural 
paternalism, it is important to recognize that the construction of highly predetermined 
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public space has remained a key task for contemporary urbanism. To reject such an 
approach out of hand would be tantamount to rejecting the whole notion of ‘user-friendly’ 
design. Nevertheless, in an important sense the New Babylon project does offer in graphic 
form a reconfiguration of the urban environment at odds with a notion of public space as 
the place of contestation. In this sense Constant’s utopia is essentially post-political in 
nature. As such it can legitimately be seen, as McDonough contends, as a prefiguration of 
the advanced depoliticization of public space that has arguably taken place in post-
industrial societies over the last forty years.  
In my view, however, ultimately the distance that came to separate Constant from 
other members of the SI is more profoundly indicative of the twofold nature of any 
comprehensive progressive urban politics. For while it is true that political contestation is 
essentially a collective practice, such practice is only possible through the existence and 
maintenance of an effective space of public appearance. While practices of insurrection 
and protest may occur instantaneously and be of short duration, properly popular 
community requires the prolonged construction and consolidation of public space. As the 
urban sociologist David Harvey has recently remarked: 
 
Distinctive communities are painstakingly built by social practices including the exercise 
of authoritarian powers and conformist restrictions. They are not just imagined (however 
important the imaginary of them may be). It is useful, therefore, to view an achieved 
‘community’ as an enclosed space (irrespective of scale or even frontier definitions) 
within which a certain well-defined system of rules prevails. To enter into that space is to 
enter into a space of rules which one acknowledges, respects, and obeys (either 
voluntarily or through some sort of compulsion). The construction of ‘community’ entails 
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the production of such a space.xlviii 
 
While acknowledging that genuine communities take the form of relatively stable rule-
governed social spaces, Harvey insists that this is no way precludes ample opportunity for 
rule-breaking on the part of what he calls the ‘insurgent architect’. In relation to such 
insurgent action he contends: “the re-making and re-imagining of ‘community’ will work 
in progressive directions only if it is connected en route to a more generalized radical 
insurgent politics”.xlix  
For such insurgent politics to be effective and credible radical urban practices are 
necessary, practices in which collective public contestation becomes a social reality. If the 
specific situationist practices of dérive and détournement are to assume genuine 
significance for contemporary urban communities, this must take place along with 
recognition of the fact that in the last forty and particularly the last twenty years cities 
have been subject to a significant intensification of state and municipal control. As Don 
Mitchell has recently remarked with respect to changes in the management of public 
space in New York over the decades leading up to the September 11 attack: “New 
strictures on behavior had become not only commonplace but also expected (and always 
indicated by prominent signs) in the city’s streets. Surveillance cameras had become an 
everyday part of the landscape. Whole public spaces had been closed off for much of the 
day, locked tight against unwanted users”l The overall result of such urban management – 
now evident as a global phenomenon – is to stigmatize public space and its ‘undesirable’ 
occupants and effectively close it down as a site of popular political agency and 
manifestation. This can be seen as the realization of an extreme version of the consensus 
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model of politics within the urban environment. As such, it precludes or at best strongly 
militates against the formation and maintenance of any genuine urban community.  
It is in light of such contemporary urban conditions that I remarked at the 
beginning of this article that the situationist critique of traditional urbanism is more 
urgent than ever. Contemporary urban management has long operated according to a 
pragmatic, technical model that in principle rejects the possibility of radical 
reorganizations of the urban order. A large factor in this pragmatism, as Harvey shows, is 
the increasingly close symbiosis between public and private agencies and funding in the 
development of ostensive ‘public’ space.li Increasingly, state agencies are placing 
restrictions on the public use of supposedly public space in the name of security and 
private business interests determine who and what can appear in such space. Against this 
backdrop the non-violent urban practices of contestation developed by the situationist 
movement offer crucial resources for reclaiming cities as genuine sites of popular agency. 
The ongoing reclamation of the texts and works of the SI promises more than just another 
instance of academic recuperation. Far more significantly, it offers the chance of 
contesting the current hegemony of state-controlled consensus politics by relocating 
radical democratic politics to its original place of action – the urban street.     
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